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Abstract  This brief study makes some reflections on the systemic paradigm and the claim that Reality is a system 
advocated by some thinkers. We argue that the General Systems Theory is an abstract theory relating to formal 
reasons that correspond to real systems scientifically established, and its development can facilitate the task 
mentioned, which is characteristic of ordinary scientific work. 
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1. Introduction 
The label ‘systems theory’ is used here to refer to the 
achievements of this entire scientific enterprise. Although, 
to be precise, one should really speak of systems theories, 
in the plural, these theories have a common character and 
reflect a common perspective. They are transdisciplinary, 
being more abstract and general than specific scientific 
theories but less abstract and general than mathematics 
and philosophy. They are components for an ‘exact and 
scientific metaphysics’ (Bunge, 1973) that is currently 
being developed but still awaits a full articulation. 
When we study the relationship between physics, 
biology, ecology, psychology and other areas of thought 
we have found that the structure of the General Systems 
Theory provides a natural extension of scientific 
knowledge to other fields of concepts. Exploration of 
systems concepts in biology, medicine and social sciences 
has shown that systemic focus confirms existing parallels 
between modern science and some philosophy of ancient 
Greece, Kabbalah, Chinese Taoism and Zen Buddhism. 
There is a profound harmony between the concepts of life, 
evolution, environment, mind, consciousness, free will, 
etc.., which are expressed in the General Systems Theory 
and is a very consistent philosophical basis for our current 
scientific thinking. 
Systems theory offers a view of the world that is more 
encompassing than any view provided by physics. From a 
physics-based ‘theory of everything,’ one would get only 
a theory about things that physicists study: to our 
understanding of life, human society and our natural 
environment. Unity of science cannot be gained by 
learning the fundamentals of physical reality; it can only 
be based on general principles that apply to all types of 
systems. By unifying science in this way, systems metaphysics 
gives us a new understanding of what we already know. 
One does not need to descend to the quantum level to see 
the world differently, and the distinctive features of 
quantum mechanics are largely irrelevant to the middle-
scale domain in which we live. Consider instead the 
implications of simply understanding the world in terms 
of the categories of (a) matter, energy, information, and 
utility, (b) structure, function, and history, and (c) the actual 
and potential. These notions are central to systems thinking 
(Gerard 1958; Miller 1978; Kauffman 2000). Truly 
assimilating them would transform our sense of the world. 
Systems theory not only helps us think in new ways 
about familiar facts, and counters the narrowness of 
received opinion, but may stimulate new explorations and 
discoveries. Given that the category of utility augments 
those of matter, energy, and information, one wants to go 
further. If matter-energy is adequate for the material realm, 
and information spans the material and the living realms 
but is more visible in the latter, and utility is distinct to the 
realm of the living, are there further realms and, if so, 
what categories are basic to them? There is at least one 
obvious other realm: just as life emerges from matter, 
mind emerges from life, so one might ask: what new 
scientific category will be central to some new scientific 
theory that helps us to understand mind not merely as 
information processing but as subjective experience? 
Despite major advances in cognitive science, what science 
has to say about this question is meager.  
Value is central to the humanities and the arts, and 
systems theory connects science to these domains. This is 
possible because systems ideas apply not only to concrete 
systems but also to abstracted and conceptual systems, i.e., 
to systems abstracted from or not even grounded in 
material reality. Systems theories have the broad scope 
inherent to mathematics, but being less abstract than 
mathematics, they address themes that are ubiquitous in 
human experience, such as order and disorder, dynamics, 
representation, communication, differentiation and 
integration, and conflict. Connections to the arts and 
humanities have been made in various ways. Ideas of 
entropy, information, and order have been applied to 
communication and form in the arts. Ideas from nonlinear 
dynamics have been used in literary studies.  
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Efforts to develop a general theory of systems have 
been paralleled by similar aspirations in the humanities. 
Modern social and literary ‘critical theory’ (Calhoun 1995; 
Culler 2000) and the movements of structuralism (Caws 
1998) and semiotics (Hervey 1982) represent comparable 
efforts to achieve coherence in the social sciences, 
humanities, and arts. Sometimes referred to simply as 
‘theory,’ this project seeks to occupy an intermediate 
niche between the abstract fields of linguistics and 
philosophy and concrete fields such as literature, political 
theory, psychoanalysis, and feminism. Resemblance to the 
niche that exact and scientific metaphysics seeks to 
occupy is plain: linguistics plays the role of mathematics 
as the means by which the world is modeled; the fields of 
literature, etc., play the role of the different scientific 
disciplines to which transdisciplinary theory is applied. 
The two projects—systems theory in the sciences and 
‘theory’ in the humanities and ‘human sciences’—have 
more in common than analogous placement of their 
epistemological niches. The structuralism of Piaget (1970) 
overlaps considerably with systems theory, and 
information theory is an important component of 
semiotics. In both systems theory and 
structuralism/semiotics, there is a pervasive abstraction. 
There is the same flirtation with the denial of objective 
reality and the affirmation of the arbitrariness of models; 
i.e., the abandonment of ontology in favor of the exclusive 
concern with epistemology, as if one could have one 
without the other. The ‘constructivist’ position is widely 
held within the systems community; Ashby (1976), who 
stressed the ‘relativity’ of models, was perhaps in this 
camp. Both movements share Spinoza as a ‘patron saint’ 
philosopher. But there is at least one major difference 
between the two: critical theory and postmodern Theory 
are highly political. While one can no doubt find in 
systems theory some ideological presuppositions and 
agendas, they are less salient than the hegemony of 
feminism, Marxism, and other ideologies in post-modern 
thought. This crucial difference makes a productive 
interaction between the systems theory and post-
modernism unlikely, although interaction continues. The 
shift from structuralism and semiotics to deconstruction 
has been a shift in the direction of skepticism, nihilism, 
and obscurity; this limits the fruitfulness of the interaction. 
It is specific for the systems research that, representing 
an object as a system, we always reflect the object through 
a discrete and finite set of elements and relations. At the 
same time, objects of the real world possess an infinite 
complexity and an infinite diversity of their properties. A 
task of the theory of knowledge is to overcome this 
contradiction and to single out from the infinite 
complexity of an object such a formation that gives 
knowledge about this object with attributes of explanation 
and forecast. It is the notion "system" that scientific 
knowledge employs for solving this task. 
Fractals are a good example of what can happen when a 
systems process that was only glimpsed in the past 
(Leibnitz, Cantor, Poincare) suddenly becomes 
popularized and made more discernable by the onset of 
computers. Fractal structure and process is an example of 
a system “process” where a seemingly structural feature 
(pattern) is actually the result of an isomorphic process. 
What we seek is better elucidation of the process that 
leads to the fractal structure on all levels and in all 
domains in which it occurs. It is the process resulting in 
fractal form that is the isomorphy, not the fractals that 
result. All fractal structures in nature are actually 
approximate because the mathematical concept of fractal 
is realistically infinite. In fractal generating processes, 
simple recursive iterations can generate complex 
structures. This makes fractal-like structures simple to 
encode and gives systems the ability to generate 
interesting and very complex structures without having to 
store a lot of information. Fractal-like structures also 
optimally dissipate energy because of the potentially near 
infinite surface space on the fractal boundaries. While 
they dissipate energy effectively they also maximize 
coverage of an area, or branching into a space. Fractal-like 
structures are found in leaf development on plants, tree 
branching, clouds, blood vessels and animal coloration 
patterns.  
2. Some Logics and Epistemological 
Considerations 
Heraclitus says: Polemos (war, strife, confrontation) has 
engendered the universe. Polemos rules the world. The 
Greek philosopher, who wrote at the beginning of V 
century B. C.E, understood therefore, that the Cosmos is a 
theater of endless fight between adverse elements where 
perpetual change is born. Polemos appears as the main law 
of the Universe. Unity and struggle of opposites, eternal 
principle of universal dynamism, and all processes are 
dynamic, and static exists only in our minds, continual 
contradiction leading to significant paradoxes. This is the 
principle of dialectical thinking: Cosmos contradictorily 
contradictory. Moreover, we find these contradictions of 
Reality in our seemingly rational models. 
Rational knowledge is formed experimenting with 
objects and events of our daily environment. This belongs 
to the Kingdom of Intellect whose function is to 
differentiate measure, compare, sort and categorize. Thus, 
we allow ourselves to create a world of intellectual 
distinctions, of opposites existing in relation to the other, 
this being the reason that knowledge is, in a way, a 
relative knowledge. 
We try to demonstrate the impossibility of a complete 
vision of Reality, through models written in symbolic 
language: the formal mathematical language1. 
We know. But how do we know? The Myth of the Cave 
lets Plato think about the process by which we have 
knowledge. Simply, the soul already knows. The soul 
comes from the World of Ideas, although the material 
body has made him forget it. They are projected shadows 
onto the back of the cave, and allow us, from the World of 
Light, however imperfectly, to remember what we already 
know. We know when we remember. 
Far from the Platonic position we can listen. In fact, it 
was Quine, in Word and Object (p. 3f), who made famous 
Neurath's analogy which compares the holistic nature of 
                                                          
1 Principle of Semiotic Incompleteness (Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-
Selva, 2012; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2014; Nescolarde-
Selva, Usó-Doménech, J. and Alonso-Stenberg, 2015): It is not possible 
to totally characterize a structure of objects or processes, through a 
language (formal or not), or to completely present a portion of "truth" 
that this language can express on these objects or processes through its 
deductive operation. 
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language and consequently scientific verification with the 
construction of a boat which is already at sea:: We are like 
sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship 
but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where 
a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, 
and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this 
way, by using the old beams and driftwood the ship can be 
shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual reconstruction. 
The authors would like to extend these words as follows: 
We are born as shipwrecked on the high seas stormy 
ocean of sensory data. In addition, the ship of knowledge 
that we will board must be designed and built without 
means, starting with the materials we encounter at sea, the 
remains of other wrecks, but despite our zeal, no one can 
help us. Other sailors, with their own abilities, can 
contemplate, but just can actively impact the channeling 
of these materials, at least until such time that our ship 
could install a communication system involving the 
development of a common language to communicate..  
As Kant said, based on the knowledge of things, the 
noumenon2- the thing itself - is inaccessible to us. Kant in 
Critique of Pure Reason (1781 [1998]) says: "The concept 
of a noumenon, i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought of 
as an object of the senses but rather as a thing in itself 
[...]"; But note that the terms are not used interchangeably 
throughout. The first reference to thing-in-itself comes 
many pages before the first to noumenon. 
Knowledge has access only to the phenomenon. 
However, to Eastern thought, phenomena are nothing. 
Nothingness is the phenomena. Is not possible to affirm 
just one aspect, and completely deny the other. That 
equates to create a completely dualistic limited and 
misleading view. There is no noumenon, everything is 
non-noumenon. However, there is the law of 
interdependence that links the existence between them. 
The one hand is the phenomena, and another eternity, 
beyond any phenomenon. These two concepts go together, 
they are inseparable. Everything is impermanent, even 
though, according to our senses, everything seems 
permanent. 
We have proposed here inaccessibility of noumenon to 
place the lines of our systemic view. We maintain that the 
systems begin with, are founded on, and are determined 
by our knowledge. Reality is systemic since we know and 
because we know and, depending on how we know. 
Because knowledge puts conditions and the main 
condition is the systemic nature of the acts that result 
knowledge. 
Here's an example: a good shooter fires a gun and the 
bullet destroys a valuable vase. We say that the shot is 
cause of the behavior of the vase. Moreover, as Hume says, 
in our experience, there is nothing relating to this cause. 
The practice leads us to incorporate the belief to referred 
causation. Rather we should say that this relationship is 
the product of a rational activity that establishes the link 
between two events. In general, relationships are not the 
object of direct experience, reception for the senses. Being 
                                                          
2 The noumenon is a posited object or event that is known (if at all) 
without the use of the senses. The term is generally used in contrast 
with, or in relation to "phenomenon", which refers to anything that 
appears to, or is an object of, the senses. In Platonic philosophy, the 
noumenal realm was equated with the world of ideas known to the 
philosophical mind, in contrast to the phenomenal realm, which was 
equated with the world of sensory reality, known to the uneducated mind. 
in this way, and because we know the relationship: where 
from? A radical empiricist would deny the authenticity of 
their use, at least in scientific knowledge? Because, there 
is another way to understand the relationships that we 
establish different from the constructions own of our 
reason? And another question: does it belong to any real 
correlation? And we insist that knowledge is studying real 
structures. 
Relationships are the essential elements in the systems. 
Moreover, if they are mental constructs, we accept that the 
systems begin with our knowledge. Systemic structures 
that our models of reality conceived - that is, the reality as 
we know it - is the result of reason: this will be an 
analytical and rational position? 
There is a system in the own knowledge of any object. 
For example: a table. I have the touch, color, heat, cold 
and a long list of perceptions. The concept of this table is 
the set of all these perceptions - or, rather, the properties 
discovered in these perceptions3. The concepts of things, 
                                                          
3 Let S be a subject, and O an object under specified conditions. Maddy’s 
conditions (Maddy, 1990, 1996; Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 
2012; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2014) for physical 
perceptions are as follows: The S perceives O if: 
1. There is O. It is the absolute being, referent or designatum. 
2. S has perceptual beliefs pB about O, in terms of the appropriate sort of 
concepts. Rather than talking about a physical object belief, one talks 
about the concept of a physical object, relative being or designata. This is 
based on the assumption that having a concept of a physical object 
entails that one has physical object beliefs. 
3. O causes S’s beliefs B about O. 
To significances, that are consequence of perceptual beliefs pB on the 
part of a Subject S of an object O with certain characteristic C, we call 
perceptual significances (p-significance) and we denote as ps. Let ps be a 
perceptual significance, pB be a set of perceptual significances such 
that { }1 2, ,...., npB ps ps ps= , ∧  be an operation meaning "subject 
S and perceives O" (perceptual conjunction),∨  be an operation 
meaning "subject S or perceives O" (perceptual disjunction). A 
perceptual field is a set pB that is a commutative group with respect to 
two compatible operations, ∧  and ∨ , with "compatible" being 
formalized by distributivity, and the caveat that the ∧ identity (ps0) has 
no ∨ inverse. Perceptual fields have the following properties:  
1) Closure of pB under perceptual conjunction and perceptual disjunction. 
 1 2 1 2 1 2, ; ,ps ps pB ps ps ps ps pB∀ ∈ ∧ ∨ ∈  
2) Associativity of perceptual conjunction and perceptual disjunction. 
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 3
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 2 3 1 2 3
, , ;ps ps ps pB
ps ps ps ps ps ps
and ps ps ps ps ps ps
∀ ∈
⇒ ∧ ∧ = ∧ ∧
∨ ∨ = ∨ ∨
 
3) Commutativity of perceptual conjunction and perceptual disjunction. 
 
1 2 1 2 2 1
1 2 2 1
, ;ps ps pB ps ps ps ps
and ps ps ps ps
∀ ∈ ⇒ ∧ = ∧
∨ = ∨
 
4) Existence of perceptual conjunction and perceptual disjunction 
identity elements 
There exists an element of pB, called the perceptual conjunction identity 
element and denoted by ps0, such that 
0;i i ips pB ps ps ps∀ ∈ ∧ = . Likewise, there is an element, 
called the perceptual disjunction identity element and denoted by psℵ , 
such that ;i ips pB ps ps psℵ ℵ∀ ∈ ∨ = .  
4) Existence of perceptual conjunction inverses and perceptual 
disjunction inverses 
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we notice similarities and differences. If included in the 
similarity function and separate the role of differences, 
then we classify things, include them in class. This fact is 
reflected in natural language that is in the form of nouns, 
adjectives and intransitive verbs. It is the same both in 
daily practice and scientific work, except on the 
systematization of the level achieved in the classifications 
based on the characteristics appealed to one and otherwise. 
Hume (1993) tells us that the reason introduces the 
relationship between the events and the reason is that 
which relates own perceptions in creating the concepts of 
everything and classes that relate these concepts4. So is 
                                                                                               
 0; /i i i ips pB ps ps ps ps∀ ∈ ∃¬ ∧¬ =  
Similarly, for any a in F other than 0, there exists an element a−1 in F, 
such that a · a−1 = 1.  
 ( ) ( )1 1; /i i i i ips pB ps ps ps ps
− −
ℵ∀ ∈ ∃ ∧ =  
5) Distributivity of perceptual disjunction perceptual conjunction 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 3
1 2 3 1 2 1 3
, , ;ps ps ps pB
ps ps ps ps ps ps ps
∀ ∈
⇒ ∨ ∧ = ∨ ∧ ∨  
A perceptual field is therefore an algebraic 
structure 1 0, , , , , ,pB ps ps
−
ℵ∧ ∨ ¬ , consisting of two abelian 
groups: 
1) pB under ∧ , ¬ , and ps0; 
2) pB \ {ps0} under ∨ , −1, and psℵ , with 0ps psℵ≠ , 
with · distributing over ∧  
∧ perceptual conjunction identity element (ps0) means no perception of 
any object. ∨  perceptual disjunction identity element ( )psℵ means 
perception of all objects including "silence" or "blanks". ips¬ means no 
perception of the object whose perceptual significance is ips  
( ) 1ips
−
means perception the complementary to ips  and "silences" or 
"blanks". 
We should ask ourselves how subject S, located before a perceptual field 
in which there are innumerable perceptual significances ps1, to highlight 
precisely one and leave us perceive others. How is this possible, that the 
circumvented objects Oi have also been perceived, if they do not lack 
quantitatively ostensible traits to justify no perception? It is a function of 
the perceiving subject. The unperceived is a significant. In other words 
what is not perceived is also a component of what is experienced, which 
can be placed in the heart of a polisyntagmatic chain that makes up the 
total discourse. That perception implies, in the logical sense of the word, 
what has ceased being noticed and somehow is discovered in what has 
been experienced3. 
By  group theory, applied to the abelian groups (pB×,∨ ), and (pB, ∧ ), 
the perceptual conjunction inverse ips¬  and the perceptual disjunction 
inverse ( ) 1ips
−
are uniquely determined by ips . Similar direct 
consequences from the perceptual field axioms include 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2ps ps ps ps ps ps¬ ∨ = ¬ ∨ = ∨ ¬ , in particular 
( )ips psℵ¬ = ¬  as well as 0 9ips ps ps∨ = . 
4 All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided 
into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of fact. Of the first 
kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic ... [which 
are] discoverable by the mere operation of thought ... Matters of fact, 
which are the second object of human reason, are not ascertained in the 
same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like 
nature with the foregoing.(An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding, Section II) 
there any way to escape to rationalism? The 
epistemological principle: The whole is greater than the 
sum of the parts is not easy to assume into crisis after the 
mathematical results of the XIX and XX century. This 
principle constantly brandished in the systemic world is 
not easy, because it involves the consequence that the 
whole is greater than its own parts. However, there are 
parties as big as the totality: Even the part of even 
numbers is as large as all of the Natural numbers. The part 
of the line segment is as great as the entire straight line5.  
We associate the term analysis with the disintegration 
in parts, synthesis being a reverse process. Today, a 
confrontation between supporters of the analysis and 
synthesis is absurd. One issue under discussion is that the 
analytic and the synthetic are fuzzy, vague concepts. It has 
been linked analytical to logical. In this sense, Descartes 
and Kant speak of the futility of Mathematical respect 
Logic. Indeed, for Kant mathematical truths are not 
analytic but synthetic. However, logic and mathematics do 
not require a priori sensible intuition. Let us remember 
that disqualification of Russell and Couturat made of Kant 
                                                          
5 a) Two sets are equipotent when there is a bijection between them.  
b) Every infinite set contains a subset that is equipotent with the set N of 
natural numbers. 
c) Definition of Dedekind: The necessary and sufficient condition that a 
set is infinite, it is equipotent to any of its parts. 
d) A set is said countable when it is equipotent with N. 
e) Every infinite set contains a countable subset. 






Classic diagram to indicate that two segments of different length are 
equipotent, 
The points of the segment s may be in one correspondence with the 
segment S by projection Π of center O. 
In Euclid's Elements, the common notion fifth (in the reorganization 
carried out by Proclus) is the postulate: "The whole is greater than the 
parts". However, this postulate is only valid for finite sets. Although 
Galileo had already indicated that could be many even natural numbers 
as natural numbers, the authentic break with the intuitive evidence held 
by such common notion, corresponds to George Cantor. The firsts 
demonstration, which implied the existence of infinite sets of different 
types, and supported by the concept of bijection, was given in 1874, 
indicating Cantor that the set of algebraic numbers were countable, while 
the set of transcendental numbers was not. 
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at first, on the occasion of analysis carried out by modern 
logic in mathematical reasoning. However, we cannot 
forget the vindication of Kant by Hintikka (1984). 
Moreover, this author makes some comments that we find 
interesting for our purposes. Kant considers the subjects in 
the tests that mathematicians make of them. Hintikka 
emphasizes the fact that this resource is inevitable to 
subjects, when they are relations. It is, without a doubt, 
the most striking difference of modern logic with the logic 
of Aristotelian syllogisms, together with the complete 
symbolization of language. Characteristic, as we shall see, 
is also useful for our purpose. According to Hintikka, in 
the language of relations, constituent structures are 
determined, coming to be determined as pieces of a puzzle, 
and sometimes require the existence of certain types of 
individuals in adjacent pieces, fitting and forming the 
puzzle. It is worth looking at this simile tells us that these 
relationships are escapades to each of the pieces separately. 
Here, the sense of analytical refers to conceptual 
analysis, without consideration of the subject. The 
inevitable recourse to the consideration of individuals 
determines the synthetic thing. This resource is inevitable 
in logic of classes, but it is not in the logic of relations. 
Moreover, if one of the elements of the system is the 
relationships, the synthesis will be one of its features. 
Because what we want to say is that the development of 
our knowledge is based on a constant tension between 
analysis and synthesis, exchangeable upon reflection, but 
difficult to conceive of one without the other. 
Our concrete knowledge is events, occurrences of 
properties captured in a moment through the senses. In 
addition, although we assume that systems already exist, 
we will do as if they were not. However, we assume in our 
knowledge of the system there is a record in which such 
events are analyzed in the sense of unbundling. We dare to 
defend it incorporating into some certain type of system in 
the very fact of the record. However, we can try to classify 
them. However, classification involves the design of a set 
of relationships between specific events relating to 
properties captured therein. Moreover, if we talk about 
relationships, synthesis will exist in the sense that it is 
inevitable reference to the singular. We can create classes 
and design a system on classes that start from events that 
we have selected 
Let us analyze this system: We are concerned about a 
certain group of their classes, as other people a different 
group. We wonder if it is feasible to create a system that 
gives rise to events, from class A in relation to the 
occurrence of events in classes B and C. A realistic would 
correct the question: will be whether the events of the 
classes A, B and C form a system and which would be this. 
On the other hand, someone accuse us of twisting the 
problem proceeding analytically. This problem exceeds a 
simple classification. We seek to transcend the system of 
knowledge developed in the search for a different system. 
A supporter of inductive Ideas speaks abstracting a second 
system from the systemic reality. However, a supporter of 
deductive thoughts says that we must build a model 
system organizing our records according to time. It means 
that although we offer a system organizing the event 
records, we cannot yet say that in this way there is a real 
correlation to the events which they belong. 
Supporters of deduction tell us that laws should be 
subject to experimentation, trying to determine the 
relationships designed. It is also possible that in the 
attempt to purify the system, decides to proceed 
analytically again. The most probable thing will be that we 
have sub-systems, or disjointed visions of possible actual 
system studied. Our knowledge, although adjacent, cannot 
be systematized. Is it feasible to consider each of these 
parcels the rest? This requires a synthesis. Because, again, 
the possible relationships between the areas, institutions 
and/or systems that are not yet connected - ignoring as 
have been related - must be built, tested, corrected, refuted, 
revised, etc.. in an integration process that involves the 
design of a new cognitive system in which we do that 
appear not detected relationships. Of achieving, this pack 
of selected Reality comes to constitute a system, different 
from the original. Not that the reality has evolved for we 
know, but as has been known, is organized in a different 
way. What remains, then, the confrontation between 
analysis and synthesis? 
The empirical work of scientists was considered 
antagonistic to the logical constructs of rationalism, a 
priori developed by systems of the philosophical and 
religious beliefs. Empiricism and logic have been 
considered, most of the time as opposites. We must be 
cautious with the use of the terms rationalism and 
empiricism, because both are misguided. Two opposing 
schools: one says that the reason is the only source of true 
knowledge, and is based primarily on logic and 
mathematics, the other asserts that all knowledge comes 
from experience, and in particular, the experience of our 
senses. Therefore, for the rationalist school, knowledge of 
the external world is analytical and derivative deduced 
from certain first principles: the Book of Nature written in 
the formal language is Mathematics, Mathematical 
Physics being a simple extension. As for the empiricist 
school, experience induces knowledge, ie knowledge is 
synthetic. It is not surprising therefore that in the world of 
science, the sciences themselves, will begin the process of 
segregation of philosophy, and that through the rational 
exercise, philosophical thought and religious systems 
(belief systems), interfere with the normal task 
Empirical knowledge of scientific was at first a mere 
collection of analytical and dispersed knowledge. No 
wonder that in such circumstances, to incorporate those 
truths comparable or similar links belonging to the 
Mathematics, became a desirable goal. In fact, 
mathematics was assimilated, not as a method of 
discovery, but as a useful tool in organizing the products 
that had been obtained by the scientists themselves. 
Moreover, recognition of the exercise of Reason came 
with the use of mathematics. Moreover, recent 
developments in logic are crucial. Mathematical Logic 
reduced its language completely up to symbolism, ie, a 
language not interpreted. Thus, the relationships 
established affect new forms of statements, being 
indifferent to content. Not exist, with the use of the new 
logic, the risk of including extraneous elements to 
scientific results. Leibniz's ideas are reborn here: universal 
calculus and the common language for all sciences. Just as 
the concept of possible unity of all scientific knowledge. 
Although it may seem paradoxical, the two key 
instruments developed by empirical rationalism will be 
critical to incorporate empirical to the development of 
science. Because if not, how to identify the different 
sciences? How do they differ from each other? What 
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characterizes the scientific knowledge in front of a 
different knowledge? How can we connect the different 
knowledge? These are questions that are largely related to 
the issues that concern the systemic thinking. And how do 
we identify the different sciences? First, are the conditions 
involved in the title, if is made abstraction of logical and 
mathematical symbolism, which are all directly or 
indirectly empirical or experimental; that is, are directly 
verifiable consequences, or that there are logical 
consequences directly verifiable. Second, they share the 
method so that they can establish their truths: the 
hypothetical-inductive-experimental method. They differ 
in their ontology, or its reference phenomenal typology 
resulting in the use of specific terminology for each of 
them, although they may share sections of this 
terminology, plus Logic and Mathematics. We do not 
consider scientists any proposition not verifiable or not 
established as experimental method. 
Carnap (1934), when he speaks of the unity of science 
sees this as a problem of Logic of Science, but not as an 
ontological problem. He does not think about reducing 
any process to a single type of process. For Carnap, the 
problem of the unity of science has two relative aspects:   
1) Logical relationships between terms. 
2) Logical relationships between laws of diverse 
Sciences. 
The first condition is a prerequisite. The second 
becomes indispensable. 
For Russell, the importance of logic in empirical 
science does not reside - as happens in mathematics - on 
inference. Rather, his interest lies in analyzing and 
understanding the identity and difference in ways not 
easily detected in the absence of a logical symbolism. 
Returning to Carnap, and referring to the unity of 
scientific language, research is a task of the Logic of 
Science; and for this reason it is a task of logicists, as a 
member of the scientific community. Would consist of 
properly fix the specific wording of each area of 
knowledge and the way they are committed to the 
experience, as well as those that are shared, including their 
semantics, along with other ideas. Thus, each chapter of 
scientific knowledge would be established mainly - where 
be feasible - so much semantics and syntax of its own 
laws. Clearly, this does not mean unification in a system, 
or knowledge in a certain type of phenomena. A possible 
axiomatization required to connect its diverse and well-
known laws, something more than a simple classification 
of refined language. A logical classification that relates 
logical structures favors the establishment of the desired 
links. Also promotes mainly the analogical reasoning and 
identification of structures in different unsuspected 
environments. As Carnap concludes, if the terms of the 
various sciences involved have any logical relationship to 
other sciences (like the relationships established in the 
reduction of the respective languages to a homogeneous 
base) would not be feasible to combine these laws to 
derive searching a solution. Although it is also true that 
the links established by this reduction may be insufficient. 
Undoubtedly, the scene would be different if the script 
was changed, if we could achieve the unit of the laws: 
something as diffuse as a Science of Science, or in other 
words, the system of all scientific knowledge. Now, it 
seems to make sense the aphorism: The whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts. However, there is a restriction: 
this means that no full knowledge is susceptible to be 
unified in a system, any system. 
In his famous theorem, Gödel showed that if arithmetic 
is consistent will be incomplete, ie, any consistent system 
of arithmetic is always a subsystem, in the sense that there 
are arithmetical truths to be outside. A similar result 
establishes Arrow in Decision Theory, when determining 
a function for a group whose members have made their 
choice in front of several alternatives, always a rational 
group decision prevails. This principle seems, a priori, be 
a mere tautology, and if so, does not say anything. 
Because it would be difficult to question if Gödel said, 
until the system is not complete, it is not complete. 
Because if it does not have this meaning, what is being 
asserted? Which among the linked parts, relationships also 
exist? Besides, is that they are not parts of the whole? So 
if it is claimed that the system is a Reality, is this a 
scientifically established statement? We think it is not. In 
this case, it must be a project or program that seeks to 
promote research in the line of unification into a single 
cognitive system all the knowledge of cognitive scattered 
fields. However, how this integration can be feasible? 
One way to carry out the integration is leaving the 
specialized scientific knowledge, with a deep study that 
can agglutinate or synthesize in global systems. If this is 
the idea that Laszlo (1998) points when he talks about the 
prospects that open in front of the philosophical 
considerations when using a General Systems Theory as 
an integrative language, let us doubt of two things: 
1) The first is a task for philosophers, as it is a task 
of empirical research. If Reality is not a well 
known system, because relationships that join 
any optional components are ignored, the 
discovery of these components is the subject of 
an experimental investigation of the same nature 
as the experienced for the components 
themselves. 
2) The second refers the case of be feasible a 
integrative metalanguage, that integrate the given 
languages. Moreover, we revert to the starting 
point: we would have achieved the unity of 
science in regards to reducing their language to a 
homogeneous base. 
Now if we can understand when Laszlo (1984) tells us 
that General Systems Theory relates to mathematical logic 
and formal apparatus. That is, an interdisciplinary doctrine 
that elaborates the principles and models applicable to 
systems without regard to their particular species, 
elements and forces implied, as von Bertalanffy points out 
in the commentary to his proposal. 
3. Conclusions 
The potential role of systems theory should not be 
exaggerated. The systems program is an auxiliary 
enterprise that complements mainstream science. 
Universities will never be reorganized along Pythagorean 
lines and systems categories—order, dynamics, 
information-processing, morphogenesis, agency, 
adaptation, etc.—will never supplant the conventional 
materiality-based organization of scientific knowledge. 
Systems theory is too abstract to be more than 
supplementation. But this supplementation is needed for 
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the continued development of science and for its 
successful application to human needs. Science now 
encounters major difficulties arising from the exponential 
growth of knowledge. Even within the same field 
scientists often cannot understand one another. There is 
little integration across scientific disciplines, and virtually 
none between science and other aspects of culture. 
Technology steadily advances in power and its 
applications are uncontrolled. 
We believe that the General Systems Theory should be 
understood in the same way that Chomsky's Universal 
Grammar: an abstract theory of languages. Therefore, this 
would be the systemic concept of Mathematics. We have 
nothing to object to this argument. Still, we think it is a 
way to continue the journey. However, it is not alone in 
the path of travel. If people think they are saying that the 
development of a General Systems Theory has eliminated 
the problem of the unity of science involving their laws, 
we must say no. Not only we does not affirm, rather we 
say categorically no. Not even if understand that, we can 
in principle generate all possible systems. Still remain the 
task of identifying all possible systems of which we are 
seeking, which is corresponding to our eventual system 
under study. Also, this is a task of empirical research and 
we believe leads to a paradoxical situation. Paradox is not 
so much in the sense of the contradictory, but it is still 
surprising. We will not be, indeed, who deny that 
somewhere success is achieved, but let us say it is not the 
best route to travel. The purpose is undoubtedly synthetic: 
looking bringing together those parts into a whole. 
However, it is also an analytical process. Of the same 
nature as was the position of the first rationalism. It seems 
that with the claim of the synthetic, systemic people are 
sinning of analytical. We must recognize that we like a 
situation of this nature. We stand as a convenient a 
constant dialectical tension between analysis and synthesis. 
We do not intend to defend the abolition of the analysis. 
The idea of developing the General Systems Theory 
should always be welcome. The concept of the system, 
different types of systems will always be a useful tool for 
an empirical search of systems. However, as happens to 
logic and mathematics, and with regard to the creation of 
empirical knowledge, one walks behind the experience 
without being able to advance through scientific 
knowledge. This may be the paradigm of a certain 
conception of our knowledge and the basis of cognitive 
science. As a general theory is not a research program 
whose results allow the luxury of the unit of scientific 
laws, but if it is an abstract theory relating to formal 
reasons that correspond to real systems scientifically 
established, and its development can facilitate the task 
mentioned, which is characteristic of ordinary scientific 
work. As a scientific project, is no different from other 
scientific research projects. Another thing is its place in 
the soul of systemic research scientist. Moreover, this per 
se, justifies the path taken. 
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